Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts

07 April 2009

Afghanistocracy. Or, Abhorrent Stability

A recent bill, passed by the Afghan legislature and signed into law by President Karzai, legalizes what in the West would be considered rape. The law states that, unless ill, wives in Afghanistan's small Shia community must have intercourse with their husbands should he demand it. Following Western attention and condemnation (President Obama called the law abhorrent), a review of the law's constitutionality has been ordered. However, the larger point remains; Americans will have to accept that the final product in Afghanistan may seem distasteful when compared to Western democracies.

Former President Bush spoke of a Jeffersonian Democracy in Afghanistan. President Obama speaks not of establishing democracy, but of establishing stability. Americans ultimately desire an Afghanistan free of terrorist safe havens. An unstable Western democracy will not provide this. A stable democracy, or a stable authoritarian government if necessary, will fare much better at preventing terrorists from launching attacks from Afghanistan. This may result in a U.S. backed strongman taking charge. An un-democratic leader with whom America can work is preferable to the chaos in which terrorists flourish.

An argument could be made that the short and medium term stabilizing benefits of an authoritarian government could lay the foundation for a future transition to democracy. Democratic governments are wonderful for their accountability and various freedoms. But the democratic process can also be used to take away freedoms, especially in countries just leaving periods of intense strife and without a history of rule of law to fall back on. Forcing democracy too quickly on a country grants strong powers to majorities perhaps not used to honoring minority rights. An authoritarian leader has the ability to provide the necessary stability, while slowly instituting democratic processes.

One thing COIN practitioners have picked up over the years is that a host government's military forces should not be organized to work like those of an occupying power. Taking Afghanistan as an example, the Afghan National Army (ANA) should operate and be organized like Taliban forces, not like the U.S. military. For starters, the ANA is in direct competition with the Taliban for the will of the Afghan people. The ANA can only win by beating the Taliban at their own game. If the Taliban are playing football, the ANA will win by playing football too and better, not by learning baseball. Also, the U.S. military has gone through several hundred years of design to be right for the U.S. It doesn't translate that easily to other nations.

Just as military structures don't always translate well, neither do political structures. The American system of government works in America because of the specific cultures and history found in the U.S. It can not simply be transported to another country with a far different background like Afghanistan and be expected to work. Democracy has to be contextualized. Afghanistan's specific cultures will influence how democracy eventually works there. Which may result in many more laws some in the West may find abhorrent.

31 March 2009

Relations with Iran. Or, Aretha had it right this whole time, R-E-S-P-E-C-T

Say what you will about the President, but the man has a way with details. Over the past week or so there have been several interviews with administration officials, including the POTUS himself and SecState Clinton, during which they referred to Iran as the Islamic Republic of Iran. I don't recall hearing the country's full name used at all during the Bush administration; he preferred "Iran," "Axis of evil," or "threat to world peace." It's a very nice touch given that the U.S. is currently attempting to build a relationship with Iran based on respect rather than fear or bullying.

The budding U.S./Iran relationship hit a high note today when the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and the Iranian foreign minister held an impromptu meeting during an international conference on Afghanistan. Afghanistan may be the glue that could hold together a sure-to-be-rocky-at-best working relationship between the U.S. and Iran.

The U.S. for obvious reasons wants to see a stable Afghanistan. For starters, stability and a strong government could mean an end to Afghan terrorist safe-havens. The greater the stability, the less American troops would be needed and the more energies could be focused on other problem areas of the world like Israel or North Korea. A stable Afghanistan would likely ease some of the tension in Pakistan's border areas as well.

Iran too has its reasons for wanting calm in Afghanistan. The Taliban were fierce enemies of Iran from the start, and the two almost came to war in 1998. Iran also seeks an end to the mass poppy production in Afghanistan, as huge numbers of Iran's many unemployed are now addicted to drugs.

Teamwork between the U.S. and Iran has many potential dividends to yield. It is commonly accepted that Iran supplied Iraqi insurgents with EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators)- a very deadly type of roadside bomb. Keeping the advanced weaponry at Iran's disposal out of the hands of Afghan insurgents would help keep coalition casualties down. Current land routes through Pakistan have come under frequent attack recently, and the impending closure of Manas Air Force Base in Kyrgyzstan, through which the bulk of supplies flows into Afghanistan, will leave the U.S. and its allies in search of additional resupply routes. Were relations to improve dramatically, Iran could provide an important overland resupply route into Afghanistan.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the U.S. and Iran find that they are able to work together on the Afghanistan issue, they may find it easier to work together on other pressing issues- such as Iran's nuclear developments. A little respect from the U.S. could go a long way.

04 March 2009

Top 5 on my radar

1. The biggest news of the day involves the International Criminal Court. For the first time in its history, the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state. That warrant was issued today for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. The warrant cites two counts of war crimes and several counts of crimes against humanity, mostly in regards to the on-going violence in Darfur.

Al-Bashir responded by kicking several aid agencies out Sudan, including Medicins sans Frontieres and OXFAM. The move does not have global approval. A number of Africans outside of Sudan fear the impact the warrant will have on peace negotiations.

For my part there are a few other consequences I worry about. First would be a coup. The people of Sudan are aware of the pariah state al-Bashir has created out of their nation. This could be a last straw. Watch for increased acts of violent resistance to the government in Khartoum over the next few weeks or months.

Even without a coup though, I'm curious to see how this warrant will be served. Likely it won't be, and will instead become just a symbolic gesture. None of the options for serving it are too appealing. An invasion by Western forces, perhaps a French contingent- doubtful. An incursion by the Sudan People's Liberation Army with Western air and logistical support- doubtful and messy. Perhaps a coalition from the African Union moves in to take care of business- doubtful, but the best option of the three. It would be a good move for the African Union to step in and police up their own. Could have good long term consequences for the AU.

2. The Afghanistan election commission has rejected the dates for the upcoming national election set by President Hamid Karzai. In fairness to Karzai, these weren't the dates he actually wanted. He had originally wanted elections to be in August. This was viewed as the earliest there would be enough security to hold successful elections. Unfortunately, Karzai's term ends in May and the Afghan constitution doesn't address the issue of who would step in for the intervening months. Karzai's opposition wasn't too keen on him having the extra unconstitutional time in power and, after raising a stink, got Karzai to name May as the time elections would be held (side note- This was not wise of them. Elections in May don't give them enough time to campaign and the victory would likely go to Karzai. Elections in August would give them months to harp on the fact that Karzai is in office unconstitutionally).

These elections are awfully important. Political stability is a must in order for Americans to see any success in the upcoming troop surge into Afghanistan. These elections will have long term effects on Afghan stability.

3. Hugo Chavez, hot off the referendum win allowing him unlimited terms in office, has nationalized the American corporation Cargill. Chavez accused the company of trying to evade price controls. We'll be seeing more of this from Chavez in the near future. These actions allow him to show Venezuelans that he is doing something, and sticking it to the gringos while he's at it. Plus, as the economy tanks and oil prices stay in the doldrums, Chavez needs the resources so he can keep funding his 21st century socialism. Unfortunately for him, there are only so many companies out there to nationalize; his house of cards will collapse eventually.

4. Newly friendly China (People's Republic of China for you Communists out there) offered to negotiate with Taiwan (Republic of China for you Nationalists out there) to end hostilities. Relations have grown significantly cheerier between the two as of late. Flights no longer have to be routed through Hong Kong; instead, direct routes fly from China to Taiwan. Economic activity is flourishing across the straits. And to think, it was only a couple of years ago when China seriously considered invading Taiwan, conducting military exercises and staging hundreds of missiles on the coast, all while the U.S. was tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is promising.

5. A South Carolina psychiatrist believes ecstasy can be used to treat soldiers with PTSD. Apparently, while high on ecstasy, soldiers are better able to dig deep into their emotions. One soldier who participated in trials had this to say: "It’s basically like years of therapy in two or three hours."

I won't get into the science of it, or if I think it could be effective. Let me just say that I'm not so certain it's a good idea to prescribe ecstasy to soldiers for a condition that can be easily faked. There may be a knucklehead or two who will try and take advantage of it. These are the same guys who miss alcohol so much in basic training that they pretend to be sick so they are prescribed a bottle of NyQuil- and then proceed to drink the whole bottle in one sitting. Free ecstasy is not a good idea.

08 February 2009

The path to victory is lined with fields of wheat

One key principle for running a successful COIN campaign is to separate the insurgents from the support of the population at-large. An insurgency enjoying high levels of public support will have an easier time hiding, recruiting, resupplying, and staging for attacks. Insurgent groups without broad support cannot convincingly claim to legitimately represent the wishes of the people.

British actions in Malaya during the 1950's provide a striking example of counter-insurgents acting to separate an insurgency from the people. Under the Briggs Plan, the British forcibly relocated 500,000 rural Malayan into concentration camps. Though angered at first, the Malayans soon came around as their standards of living increased and they were given money and ownership of the land inside the camps (they had previously not enjoyed ownership of the land on which they had resided). The Briggs Plan separated the population from the communist insurgents on two important levels: physically and mentally. Physically, because the insurgents no longer enjoyed the ability to hide among the people, nor could they receive resupply from the population (many starved). Mentally, because in the battle for hearts and minds, the guerrillas could not compete with the quality of life or ownership of land offered by the British.

Though it would be politically impossible in Afghanistan to put people into concentration camps (and would not be a successful strategy for this particular conflict anyhow), the same principle of needing to separate the people from the insurgents remains true today. For years, poppy production has linked the two. Poppies are a cash crop and the number one export in Afghanistan. Their cultivation and subsequent use in the drug trade provided $500 million to the Taliban and other criminal groups in Afghanistan last year.

After years of increasing poppy production, the numbers are finally starting to turn around. A number of factors are responsible for the change, including: changing weather conditions; the market value of opium falling by 20% over the past year, and by nearly 50% over the past two years; government pressure (over half of the farmers claimed this reason as most important in their decision to stop cultivating poppy plants); and a USAID program promoting the planting of wheat (COIN is not just a military issue- it involves economic development and civil administration among a whole host of other stability operations).

Past efforts to destroy or discourage poppy production failed to provide an alternative for poverty stricken farmers. Wheat now provides that needed alternative. USAID provides seed, fertilizer, and irrigation to the farmers, who in return grow wheat instead of poppies (the success of this program has been helped by the 50% increase in the price of wheat. It will be interesting to see what will happen when wheat prices decrease and opium prices increase).

Though not quite the same level of separation achieved by the British in Malaya, there are still many positive benefits to be realized in Afghanistan. First and foremost, the decrease in poppy production will put a dent in the Taliban's finances. Instability and lawlessness will also be lessened as more and more people rely on legal means providing for themselves. And as the guerrillas were necessary middle-men for the selling of Afghan poppy harvests to the outside world, at least one mental link between the people and the insurgency will also be cut with the farmers no longer seeing themselves as needing to rely on insurgents for an income.

Sustaining this decrease in poppy production could have fantastic long term effects on Afghanistan's stability. The increase in wheat fields may not be the type of surge military leaders had in mind, but they should accept and take advantage of it nonetheless.